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Abstract  
The debate on the entrepreneurial university has raised questions about what motivates 
academics to engage with industry. This paper provides evidence, based on survey data 
for a comprehensive sample of UK investigators in the physical and engineering 
sciences. Our results suggest that most academics engage with industry to further their 
research rather than to commercialize their knowledge. However, there are differences 
in terms of the channels of engagement. While patenting and spin-off company 
formation is motivated exclusively by commercialization, joint research, contract 
research and consulting are strongly informed by research-related motives. We conclude 
that policy should refrain from focusing on monetary incentives for industry 
engagement and consider a broader range of incentives for promoting interaction 
between academia and industry.  
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1. Introduction  
The ‘entrepreneurial university’ is in vogue (Etzkowitz, 2003; Slaughter and Leslie, 
1997). Proponents of the entrepreneurial university claim that universities are being 
transformed from ivory towers to engines of economic growth (Feller, 1990; Florida 
and Cohen, 1999). In similar vein, others argue that universities and industry are 
converging towards a hybrid order where the differences between scholarly and 
commercial logics are becoming blurred (Owen-Smith, 2003). Policy-makers in a 
number of countries are promoting such developments by encouraging collaboration 
between academia and industry (Mowery and Nelson, 2004). Implicit in many accounts 
of the entrepreneurial university is the assumption that academic researchers engage 
with industry in order to commercialize their knowledge. Thus, policy-makers are 
providing monetary incentives to facilitate their commercial involvement (Lach and 
Schankerman, 2008).  
In this paper, we investigate whether this assumption about the entrepreneurial 
academic is backed by evidence on academics’ motivations for engagement with 
industry. We present the results of a large scale survey of physical and engineering 
faculty at UK universities. We find, first, that commercialization ranks as the least 
important motivation for engaging with industry, and that research-related reasons 
dominate. Thus, it would seem that academics engage with industry mainly to support 
their academic research activities. Second, we find that the academics’ motivations 
differ depending on the channel of engagement. We examine both classic technology 
transfer mechanisms, including patenting and spin-off companies, and more 
collaborative modes of interaction, including joint research, contract research and 
consulting. While patenting and spin-off involvement are motivated by 
commercialization, engagement in collaborative interaction is dominated by research-
related motivations, including learning from industry and fund-raising.  
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Our analysis contributes to the debate on the entrepreneurial university by shedding 
light on its micro-foundations (Jain et al., 2009). It is important for universities and 
policy-makers to understand the individual motivational drivers for university-industry 
relations. Our discussion suggests that undue policy emphasis on commercialization 
obscures the fact that industry engagement often generates considerable benefits for 
academic research. We conclude that, given academics’ motivations, to talk of 
convergence between scholarship and commerce may be premature, although 
interaction between these realms continues to be mutually beneficial.  
The paper is structured as follows. Drawing on the existing literature, we outline the 
debate on the entrepreneurial university. By giving a voice to both its proponents and 
critics, we identify questions that have been left unanswered and formulate our research 
questions. We present survey data from a sample of UK academics, which enable us to 
investigate their reasons for engagement with industry and, specifically, whether 
different channels of engagement are underpinned by different motivations. We 
conclude by discussing the implications of our results against context of the existing 
literature, and deriving some policy conclusions.  
2. Conceptual considerations  
2.1. The entrepreneurial university: Overview and main research questions  
Universities are increasingly being called upon to contribute to economic development 
and competitiveness (Feller, 1990) and policy-makers have implemented measures 
aimed at increasing the rate of commercialization of university technology. These 
measures range from laws governing intellectual property (IP) arising from public 
research, government funding for university technology transfer offices and promotion 
of translational research and public-private research partnerships (Mowery and Sampat, 
2005; Siegel et al., 2007; Zerhouni, 2003). While not prejudging the effectiveness of 
these policies, various trends would seem to indicate a growing ambition among 
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universities to respond to the call for a greater role in technology development, 
demonstrated by an increasing propensity among universities to patent (Nelson, 2001; 
Stiglitz and Wallsten, 1999), increased revenues derived from university licensing 
(Thursby et al., 2001), increasing numbers of university researchers engaging in 
academic entrepreneurship (Shane, 2005), a growing share of industry funding in 
university income (Hall, 2004), and the diffusion of technology transfer offices, industry 
collaboration support offices and science parks (Siegel et al., 2003).  
The growing involvement of universities in technology transfer and commercialization 
raises questions about their nature and mission (McKelvey and Holmén, 2009). 
Advocates of the ‘triple helix’ theory claim that universities have embraced economic 
and social development as a new mission, in addition to their traditional missions of 
teaching and research (Etzkowitz, 1998). In embracing this new task, universities are 
becoming part of a coherent system that includes industry and government and 
underpins innovation and economic progress (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 2000). 
Implicit in this view is that the role of academics is shifting. Rather than concentrating 
on ‘blue-skies’ research, academics are seen increasingly to be eager to bridge the 
worlds of science and technology, in an entrepreneurial way, by commercializing the 
technologies that emerge from their research (Clark, 1998; Etzkowitz, 2003; Shane, 
2004).  
By actively engaging in technology development, universities are demonstrating 
ambidexterity in their ability to produce both scientific knowledge and technology 
outputs (Ambos et al., 2008). In an analysis of the publishing and patenting activities of 
the most research-intensive US universities, Owen-Smith (2003) finds there is 
convergence towards a ‘hybrid system’ linking scientific and technological success. 
Specifically, he shows that academic success drives technological invention while 
advantages in technological invention are driven by organizational learning relating to 
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procedures and organizational arrangements for identifying, protecting and managing 
IP. Over time, positive feedback loops between the two realms lead to a hybrid order 
where the best universities excel in scientific research and technology 
commercialization (Owen-Smith, 2003).  
Critics have responded by underlining the potentially detrimental effects of 
‘entrepreneurial’ science on the long-term production of scientific knowledge, voicing 
fears that academic science is being instrumentalized and even manipulated by industry 
(Krimsky, 2003; Noble, 1977; Slaughter and Leslie, 1997). Many universities appear to 
have become ‘knowledge businesses’ which are focused not so much on generating a 
public good for a national audience but providing services to specific stakeholders 
(McKelvey and Holmén, 2009; Vallas and Kleinman, 2008). The perceived risks 
include a shift in scientific research from basic research towards more applied topics 
and less academic freedom (Behrens and Gray, 2001; Blumenthal et al., 1986), lower 
levels of research productivity among academics (Agrawal and Henderson, 2002) and a 
slowing-down of open knowledge diffusion (Nelson, 2004; Rosell and Agrawal, 2009). 
Existing empirical research provides little evidence to support the first two of these 
concerns, but indicates there may be some justification for concerns over open 
knowledge diffusion, although the evidence is not conclusive.  
Academics’ involvement with industry would appear, therefore, to be largely 
compatible with the continuing generation of scientific output. It is possible that this is 
because university researchers en masse have not become academic entrepreneurs and 
sacrificed scientific rigour on the altar of Mammon. In this paper, we adopt this line of 
reasoning and investigate academics’ motives for engaging with industry. If their 
engagement with industry is driven by a desire to further their research rather than to 
exploit their knowledge, then cooperation is unlikely to be driven by entrepreneurialism, 
which questions the description of the entrepreneurial university and the policy 
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measures implemented to promote its existence.  
2.2. Why do academics engage with industry?  
Universities are professional bureaucracies whose members are relatively free to choose 
the activities that they believe are in the overall interests of the organization (Mintzberg, 
1983). Engaging with industry constitutes discretionary behaviour for academics. In 
addition, many universities have formal policies for encouraging their academic staff to 
pursue industry assignments for a specified share of their time (Perkmann and Walsh, 
2008). Royalty sharing policies at many universities provide incentives for the 
disclosure of inventions to the university administration (Bercovitz and Feldman, 2008) 
and subsequent participation of inventors in product development efforts via spin-off 
companies or licensing (Lowe, 2006).  
Deployment of these incentive mechanisms presupposes that academic researchers 
respond to financial incentives tied to successful commercialization of their ideas. This 
is implicit in life cycle theories that maintain that junior researchers focus on building 
reputation in academia and later in their careers capitalize on their expertise by reaching 
out to industry (Stephan and Levin, 1992; Zuckerman and Merton, 1972). A qualitative 
study by Owen-Smith and Powell (2001) provides some support for the idea that 
academics are attracted by monetary profit. The authors find that in the life sciences – 
where patents have higher monetary value – researchers patent to enhance their 
incomes. In the physical sciences, on the other hand, patenting is less attractive because 
of lower monetary pay-offs and therefore is pursued primarily to develop relationships 
with firms, access equipment or exploit other research-related opportunities (Owen-
Smith and Powell, 2001).  
However, there is a range of contributions that suggests that working with industry is 
not necessarily underpinned by entrepreneurial intentions in the sense of responding to 
economic opportunities. Bercovitz and Feldman (2008) find that faculty members’ 
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compliance with entrepreneurial behaviour can be substantial or symbolic. Only under 
certain conditions – e.g. presence of local entrepreneurial norms - do academics engage 
in substantial entrepreneurial behaviour as opposed to superficial compliance.  
Research on attitudes to academic entrepreneurship present a differentiated picture. 
Data on US universities indicate that most academics, particularly in the engineering 
and the applied sciences, are keen on technology transfer activities, but less so on overly 
commercial schemes such as start-up assistance to new technology firms, and equity 
investment (Lee, 1996). Faculty in high ranked institutions are less in favour of 
academic entrepreneurship than academics at lower tier universities although discipline 
is still a fairly dominant explanatory factor. The main concern of academics is that 
industry involvement might restrict academic freedom, i.e. the ability to pursue 
curiosity-driven research without having to consider commercial gain (Lee, 1996). In a 
related study, academic respondents express significant support for industry 
collaboration in terms of the benefits related to their research (Lee, 2000). A meta-study 
shows that academic researchers’ attitudes to financial ties with industry sponsors are 
largely positive, especially when funding is indirectly related to their research, 
disclosure is agreed upfront, and ideas are freely publicized (Glaser and Bero, 2005). A 
study of German academic researchers in four disciplines suggests that acquiring 
additional research funds and learning from industry constitute the main motives for 
engaging with industry (Meyer-Krahmer and Schmoch, 1998). A survey of Italian 
academic inventors indicates that patenting is seen as enhancing prestige and reputation 
and providing new impulses for research, but that personal remuneration is not seen as 
important (Baldini et al., 2007).  
This review of the literature on academic motivation suggests that the reason why many 
university researchers engage with industry is to further their research rather than to 
pursue the commercialization of their ideas. Thus, rather than being entrepreneurs, 
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many academics are collaborating with industry to support their research. Benefits from 
industry cooperation include securing funds for graduate students, accessing laboratory 
equipment, gaining insights applicable to academic research, and supplementing 
research monies (Mansfield, 1995). 
2.3. Research questions  
Even though the literature sheds light on certain aspects of university-industry 
engagement, it leaves two questions unanswered. First, attitudinal studies provide 
respondents’ views about industry engagement, but do not connect them with actual 
collaboration (Glaser and Bero, 2005; Lee, 1996). Second, many studies focus on 
specific types of academic industry involvement, with a number of contributions 
investigating academics’ motives for engaging in patenting (Baldini et al., 2007; 
Moutinho et al., 2007; Owen-Smith and Powell, 2001). However, interactions between 
universities and industry take multiple forms (Cohen et al., 2002) and channels of 
cooperation range from inter-organizational relationships (e.g. joint research or contract 
research) to spin-off companies, to IP transfer including patenting and licensing 
(Bercovitz and Feldman, 2006; Bonaccorsi and Piccaluga, 1994; Carayol, 2003; Cohen 
et al., 2002; D'Este and Patel, 2007; Schartinger et al., 2002). The focus on patenting is 
a major limitation of these studies as the role of IP rights in transferring knowledge is 
modest (Agrawal and Henderson, 2002; D'Este and Patel, 2007). At the same time, 
although the literature on university-industry relationships emphasizes the range of 
collaboration types (Cohen et al., 2002; Meyer-Krahmer and Schmoch, 1998; 
Schartinger et al., 2002), it does not examine the rationales underpinning these 
activities. We need also to know whether the multiplicity of interaction forms is part of 
a single phenomenon – increasing ‘commercialization’ of university science – or is 
indicative of a more heterogeneous reality. Our first research question is:  
Q1: What are academic researchers’ motivations for engaging with industry?  
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Furthermore, given the multi-channel nature of industry collaboration, we also need to 
examine whether motivations differ among the various channels of interaction. 
Attitudinal research shows that academics draw certain ‘boundaries’ between the forms 
of industry engagement they see as legitimate, and others that they view as overly 
commercial (Lee, 1996). We need to investigate where this boundary lies and how it 
reflects on academics’ motivations to engage with industry.  
We can distinguish between two broad types of engagement. On the one hand, there are 
some classic means of research commercialization, such as patenting and spin-off 
companies. Involvement in patenting means that the names of academic researchers 
appear in the list of inventors, in patents held by individuals, universities, firms or other 
organizations. While patenting may not necessarily involve direct collaboration with 
industry, it indicates an interest in industry problems and applications (Zucker et al., 
1998). Thus, patenting can be seen as a form of industry engagement. In the case of 
spin-off companies, academics establish financial ties with for-profit firms, providing 
the opportunity for economic participation in the commercialization of technology 
(Pirnay et al., 2003).  
On the other hand, working with industry can involve collaboration through joint 
research, contract research and consulting. Joint (or collaborative) research among 
academic and industry researchers is widespread (Perkmann and Walsh, 2007). Contract 
research refers to industry commissioned applied research carried out by university 
researchers. Consulting involves application-oriented research or advice, commissioned 
and funded by industry, and provided by academics (Perkmann and Walsh, 2008). Thus, 
our second research question is:  
Q2: What are academics’ motivations for their engagement with industry through 
different channels?  
The empirical study in this paper is designed to provide answers to these two questions. 
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Our analysis is based on survey data collected from physical and engineering science 
faculty at UK universities, and investigates their motivations to engage in the channels 
of collaboration described above. Our research design allows us to compare directly 
academics’ motivations for involvement with industry, across different types of 
engagement.  
Section 3 describes the data and research methodology; Section 4 presents our findings 
and Section 5 discusses the implications of our study. 
3. Data and main variables 
3.1. Sample and data collection 
Our data are derived from a large-scale survey of university researchers aimed at 
obtaining information on their interactions with industry. The sample was compiled 
from the record of holders of research grants from the UK’s Engineering and Physical 
Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) between 1999 to 2003. The EPSRC provides 
research funding mainly to university-based investigators based on applications 
submitted in response to open calls. It distributes 20-25% of the total UK public science 
budget. The EPSRC actively encourages partnerships between researchers and the 
potential users and beneficiaries of research, such as industry, government, National 
Health Service (NHS) trusts and non-profit organizations. Almost 45% of EPSRC-
funded projects involve partnerships with industry or other stakeholders.  
To ensure our sample was representative of the population of researchers in the physical 
and engineering sciences, we excluded disciplines whose researchers might be likely to 
apply to other research councils. The ten disciplines considered in our study are: 
Chemical Engineering; Chemistry; Civil Engineering; Computer Science; Electrical and 
Electronic Engineering; General Engineering; Mathematics; Mechanical, Aeronautics 
and Manufacturing Engineering; Metallurgy and Materials; and Physics. The sample 
includes 4,337 researchers, corresponding to approximately 42% of the population of 
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active researchers in our target disciplines.1  
Generalization of our results to the whole population of university researchers should be 
made with care for three reasons. First, our sample excludes the life sciences and 
medicine, where university-industry collaboration traditionally plays an important role. 
Second, even for disciplines within the EPSRC remit, it does not capture researchers 
relying solely on other forms of funding (e.g. from industry). Third, since our surveyed 
population includes only grant recipients this might bias the sample towards particularly 
successful and/or comparatively senior researchers.  
The survey was administered by post in 2004 and generated 1,528 returned and valid 
questionnaires, a response rate of 35.2%. Our tests for response bias indicate that there 
are no statistically significant differences among response rates across scientific 
disciplines.2 However, there are statistically significant differences with respect to 
certain individual characteristics, including the proportion of respondents and non-
respondents holding collaborative grants over the period 1991-2003 (57% and 53% for 
respondents and non-respondents, respectively), and being a professor (44% and 39% 
for respondents and non-respondents, respectively). Overall, though, response rate 
biases are relatively minor and unlikely to affect the results.  
The questionnaire contained questions on various aspects of industry engagement.3 Our 
analysis is based on information on the frequency of academic engagement through five 
channels and respondents’ reasons for engagement, gleaned from responses to the 
question: ‘Please rank the following reasons for your involvement in interactions with 
industry according to their importance’ from among 12 items (see Table 1). 
 
1 According to data from the UK 2001 Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) 
2 Response rates (no. of valid returned questionnaires relative to population surveyed) by discipline: 
Chemical Eng., 35.6%; Chemistry, 35.9%; Civil Eng., 35.5%; Computer Sci., 30.2%; Electric & 
Electronic Eng., 34.7%; General Eng., 39.7%; Mathematics, 38.4%; Mechanical, Aero. & Manufacturing 
Eng., 36.9%; Metallurgy & Materials, 34.2%; and Physics, 32.7%.   
3 See D’Este and Patel (2007) for a detailed description of the questionnaire and survey results. 
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Respondents were asked to score the importance of each item on a five-point Likert 
scale, ranging from ‘not important’ (1) to ‘extremely important’ (5). We carried out a 
factor analysis (principal component analysis - PCA) on these 12 items to determine 
whether they corresponded to more general, underlying rationales for engagement with 
industry. We refer to these factors as ‘motivations’.  
We analysed our data via ordered logit regressions, using engagement in various types 
of channels as the dependent variables.  
3.2. Dependent, explanatory and control variables  
We consider five dependent variables, each representing frequency of industry 
engagement via a specific channel: joint research agreement, contract research 
agreement, consulting, spin-off company establishment, and patenting. Respondents 
were asked: ‘How frequently were you engaged in the following types of activity in the 
calendar years 2002 and 2003?’ They were given a choice of five intervals: 0, once or 
twice, 3 to 5 times, 6 to 9 times, and 10 times or more.4 Based on responses, and given 
that activity was strongly concentrated in the first two interval categories, we defined 
our dependent variables as ranging between 0 and 2, 0 if the researcher had no 
involvement for a type of activity, 1 for one or two instances, and 2 if the researcher 
engaged three or more times in an activity (see descriptive statistics in Table A1 in the 
Appendix). There is little overlap among these channels, while there is positive and 
significant bivariate correlation between each pair; Spearman correlation coefficients 
range from 0.12 to 0.34. Since our dependent variables are discrete and ordered, we use 
ordered logit models for our estimations.  
The three channels with the highest proportion of researchers engaging at least once are: 
contract research, joint research, and consulting. More than 50% of respondents 
indicated using each of these channels at least once in the period analysed.   
 
4 However, for patents, respondents were requested to report the actual number of patent applications.  
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We used the motivational factors resulting from our factor analysis as the main 
explanatory variables (see Table A2 in the Appendix for descriptive statistics). 
Specifically, we regressed each of the frequency measures on the extent to which 
respondents assessed each motivation as important. We measured the importance 
attributed to a specific motivation by taking the average score of each respondent’s 
assessment of the importance of the single incentive items that composed each 
motivation. For instance, if one factor comprised four items, the average score refers to 
the average of these four incentive items. Since each item in the questionnaire was 
ranked on a five-point Likert scale, our measure for each motivation ranges between 1 
and 5; the higher the number, the higher the importance attached to a specific 
motivation.  
We used a number of control variables reflecting the characteristics of individual 
university researchers and their organizational environments. We aimed to control for 
individual experience and career-stage effects through the following variables: a) extent 
of previous involvement with industry, measured by number of joint publications with 
industry in the period 1995-2000, and average value of collaborative EPSRC grants 
(i.e. with industry) obtained by the researcher between 1995 and 2001;5 and b) 
researcher’s age and academic status (i.e. whether the researcher is a professor or not).  
Our organization-level control variables include the impact of department size, the 
composition of departmental research funding, and research quality of the institution. 
Previous research shows that these organizational characteristics could have an impact 
on the extent to which researchers engage with industry (Belkhodja and Landry, 2007; 
Feldman et al., 2002; Schartinger et al., 2002; Tornquist and Kallsen, 1994). We 
considered the following variables: a) size of the department to which the researcher is 
affiliated (measured by average number of full-time equivalent staff for the period 
 
5 Both variables log transformed.  
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1998/99-2000/01); b) volume of research funding at department level, including volume 
of research income from contracts with industry per member of staff, and volume of 
research income from public sources per member of staff over the same period (both 
indicators refer to the period 1998/99-2000/01);6 and c) departmental research quality 
proxied by the 2001 UK RAE rating. We use dummy variables to identify departments 
with the highest score (5*) and departments ranked lower than five, using point five as 
the reference category.7 Finally, we include scientific discipline and regional dummies 
to control for differences across scientific fields and geographic location in terms of 
researchers’ propensities to engage with industry. Some of information underpinning 
the control variables is from non-survey sources, such as records of previous 
collaborative grants, joint publications, or RAE research rankings, in order to alleviate 
some common method bias.  
3.3. Control for selection bias  
Only respondents reporting engagement with industry (1,088 individuals - 71% of 
1,528) were asked about their motivations. Because this risks introducing selection bias 
since we do not account for why researchers decide to engage with industry, we use a 
two-stage regression model, drawing on Manning et al. (1987). In the first stage, we ran 
a logit model with the dependent variable for whether a researcher engaged with 
industry or not. We included five control variables to capture perceived barriers to 
engaging with industry, and some individual and departmental features; information 
was available from all 1,528 respondents for all these variables.8  
 
6 Data on department finances and staff numbers are from www.hesa.ac.uk. Variables for industry and 
public research funding, and number of staff, were computed at department level as averages for the 
academic years 1998-99 and 2000-01. Public research funding refers to funding for research from any of 
the UK research councils. Finance data are in £’000. All variables log transformed.  
7 The choice of these three categories is based on the fact that the reference category accounts for a large 
proportion of departments: three categories produces a more even distribution of departments. 
Information on UK RAE 2001 is from: www.hero.ac.uk.  
8 The 5 variables related to barriers are dichotomous variables which take the value 1 if the respondent 
assessed the barriers as very, or extremely important. The 5 barriers are: absence of established 
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From this model we calculated the predicted probability for each individual to engage 
with industry. We then ran a second stage model for individuals who engaged at least 
once, but controlled for selection bias by including the predicted probabilities of 
interaction from the first stage model (variable name: prob.). In the second stage, we 
used frequency of engagement in the various channels as defined above (section 3.3) as 
dependent variables, in ordered logit regressions. 
4. Results  
4.1. Taxonomy of motivations for engaging with industry   
Table 1 presents descriptive results for the different incentive items, broken down by 
discipline, to indicate the proportion of respondents assessing an item as very or 
extremely important (i.e. scores of 4 or 5).  
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here  
-------------------------------- 
Two issues emerged. First, there is significant variation in terms of which incentive 
items researchers deem to be important. While 74.5% of researchers rated ‘applicability 
of research’ as highly important, only 11.1% rated ‘seeking IP rights’ similarly. Also, 
‘access to personal income’ was considered important by only 16% of academics, 
indicating that pecuniary gains were far less significant than other reasons for working 
with industry.  
Second, there was variation across disciplines, with some notable differences such as 
those between engineering, and chemistry, computer science, mathematics and physics. 
Across the engineering fields, there are few statistical differences in terms of incentives 
 
procedures to collaborate with industry; nature of my research not aligned with industry interests or 
needs; potential conflicts with industry regarding royalty payments from patents or other IP rights; short 
term orientation of industry research; and rules and regulations imposed by university or government 
funding agency. The results of the first-stage logistic regressions are available on request.  
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researchers ranked as important.9 Significantly fewer researchers in mathematics and 
chemistry, assessed items as important compared to the overall sample. Computer 
scientists and physicists occupied an intermediate position, since for approximately half 
of the items, proportions were not statistically different from those prevailing in the 
engineering fields.  
A factor analysis conducted on the 12 items resulted in four factors (Table 2). The first 
comprises five items, all related to expectations related to learning opportunities from 
engagement with industry. We labelled this ‘learning’ motivation. The second factor, 
which we labelled ‘access to in-kind resources’, reflects keenness to access resources, 
such as materials, research expertise and equipment. The third factor is related to 
expectations about ‘accessing funding’ for research. The fourth factor, which we 
labelled ‘commercialization’, reflects expectations of personal economic returns (PCA 
results are reported in Table A3 in the Appendix). 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here  
-------------------------------- 
A first evaluation of these results reveals that three motivations, i.e. learning, access to-
in-kind resources, and access to funding, are related to supporting academics’ research 
and only commercialization is related to deriving economic benefit from the research. 
We look at the implications of this finding in the discussion section.  
4.2. Relationship between types of motivation and channels of interaction 
Having identified four independent motivations for academics to engage with industry, 
we conducted a regression analysis to examine the impact of these motivations on 
different channels of interactions.  
 
9 The two items where there were significant differences across engineering fields are: ‘feedback from 
industry’ and ‘access to equipment’. 
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Table 3 presents the results for the relationship between frequency of interaction via 
five channels, and researchers’ ranking of the importance of the four motivations. We 
find that certain motivations have a distinct influence on the frequency of interactions 
across engagement channels. The learning motivation is positively associated with 
higher frequencies of industry engagement across several channels, i.e. joint research, 
contract research and consulting, all of which are based on relationships involving 
personal contacts with industry partners.  
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here  
-------------------------------- 
Commercialization as a main motivation is positively associated with spin-off company 
activity, consulting and patenting, but shows no significant relationship with frequency 
of engagement in any of the other channels. Researchers who regard access to funding 
as particularly important engage more frequently in joint research, contract research and 
to some degree, consulting, although this last is only weakly significant. In contrast, 
high importance of access to in-kind resources has a negative effect on the frequency of 
engagement in contract research, consulting, spin-offs and patenting, and no significant 
impact on joint research.  
Finally, with respect to our control variables, these results show that, ceteris paribus, 
experience in collaborative research increases the probability of more frequent 
collaboration via several channels. While being a professor has a positive impact on 
engagement frequency (with the exception of spin-off company activity), being a young 
researcher has a positive impact on the frequency of engagement in joint research and 
consulting. Researchers in lower-rated research departments tend to do more consulting 
compared to researchers in high ranked departments, while researchers in departments 
with higher ratios of per capita research income from industry are particularly likely to 
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engage in more frequent contract research. We also found some variation across 
disciplines. For instance, while chemists are less likely to engage in contract research 
and consulting compared to mechanical engineers, they are more likely to patent. 
To confirm the robustness of our results, we conducted analyses using different 
constructions for the dependent variables. For instance, we devised dichotomous 
dependent variables and ran probit and logit regressions. The results are similar to those 
in Table 3. Also, since interaction via one channel may not be independent of activity 
via another, we conducted multivariate probit analysis to capture possible 
interdependencies among different channels, based on the STAT routine proposed by 
Cappellari and Jenkins (2003). Table A4 in the Appendix reports the results for the 
multivariate probit model, which are in line with those in Table 3.  
As our information is drawn from a survey, the results do not provide ultimate answers 
about the direction of causation. However, conceptually, we would argue that it is more 
likely that motivation determines the frequency of engagement than vice versa. 
5. Discussion and implications  
In this paper, we investigate two questions: what motivates academics to engage with 
industry, and how do their motivations differ with respect to various ways of engaging 
with industry? We identified four main motivations: (i) commercialization (commercial 
exploitation of technology or knowledge); (ii) learning (informing academic research 
through engagement with industry); (iii) access to funding (complementing public 
research monies with funding from industry); and (iv) access to in-kind resources (using 
industry-provided equipment, materials and data for research).  
Three of these factors are research-related; only one is related to an intention to be 
entrepreneurial. In fact, our results suggest that most academics engage with industry in 
order to further their own research, either through learning or through access to funds 
and other resources. In addition, commercialization on average was ranked lowest by 
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our survey respondents (Appendix Table A2).  
While the desire to raise funds for research is intuitively appealing, the learning 
motivation requires clarification. The items related to the ‘learning’ motivation refer to 
the expected benefits from gaining new insights, receiving feedback on research, and 
accessing new knowledge through engagement with industry. These benefits are likely 
to arise from an important yet often under-appreciated aspect of public research, i.e. 
backward linkages from applied technology. For instance, resolving problems that occur 
in technology development can lead to follow-on research activities, inform academic 
research agendas and in some cases even lead to new scientific disciplines (Rosenberg, 
1982). Mansfield (1995) observes that the problems that many academics choose to 
work on are often inspired by their consulting activities. Also, a significant share of 
basic public research is associated with ‘Pasteur’s quadrant’, i.e. is driven by the pursuit 
of basic understanding and considerations of use (Stokes, 1997). Much research in 
biotechnology, computer science, aeronautical engineering and other disciplines 
conforms to the Pasteur logic. It involves an intrinsic affinity between academic and 
industry research, which has implications for academics’ motivations for choosing to 
interact with industry. Thus, whenever researchers engage in research that is driven by 
considerations of both basic understanding and use, the ‘learning-based’ logic for 
interaction is likely to be prevalent.  
We also find that engagement in different forms of interaction is underpinned by 
varying motivations. Academics motivated by learning frequently engage in joint 
research, contract research and consulting, while motivations related to 
commercialization of research lead to engagement in activities such as patenting, spin-
offs and consulting. It should be borne in mind, however, that patenting and 
involvement in spin-off companies are relatively rare compared to involvement in 
collaborative forms of interaction. Only around 15% of respondents participated in spin-
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off companies, and approximately 30% of respondents reported filing patents.   
The channels of engagement underpinned by research-related motivations, particularly 
learning and access to funding, are all based on direct collaboration with industry 
partners, which suggests that academic research interests benefit most from highly 
interactive, ‘bench-level’ relationships with industry users. The fact that ‘access to in-
kind resources’ is negatively related to most forms of interaction requires further 
comment. As joint research is not affected by this relationship, it appears that, 
particularly the more commercial forms of interaction, are rarely directly conducive to 
carrying out academic research. For instance, data derived from consultancy work or 
contract research may not be sufficiently novel for publication. However, these direct 
effects tend to be outweighed by indirect benefits, such as learning and access to 
research funding. Learning is an indirect benefit in that industry projects may not lead 
directly to novel scientific outputs, but may lead to new research problems and learning 
about new industrial applications (Perkmann and Walsh, 2009). Access to funding is 
also an indirect benefit as it may facilitate economies of scale and retention of staff at 
university laboratories.  
It would appear from our results that there is a tension between commercialization and 
research-related motivations. While patenting and spin-off involvement are driven by 
commercialization, the more collaborative forms of interaction are driven by research-
related motivations, but not commercialization. For patenting and spin-off involvement, 
our results confirm the basic premise of the entrepreneurial university. Academics 
engage in these activities because they are interested in deriving personal pay-offs from 
the commercialization of their knowledge and technologies. However, they do not 
appear to derive significant research-related benefits from this entrepreneurial 
behaviour. The reverse applies to collaborative forms of interaction: the motivations for 
joint research and contract research are clearly research-driven and commercialization 
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plays no role.  
Consulting is an exception to this pattern in that it is driven by both commercialization 
and research-related motivations. Consulting is ‘polyvalent’ as it allows academics to 
pursue personal income in an entrepreneurial manner (Louis et al., 1989), and to build 
personal relationships with industry practitioners and learn about industry problems and 
applications. Provision of consultancy, therefore, would be attractive for researchers 
who are driven by learning motivations (Mansfield, 1995; Murray, 2002). Thus, 
consulting may constitute the ‘boundary’ to university-industry collaboration (Lee, 
1996) in the sense that it marks the limits to what constitutes research-relevant 
involvement with industry. So, while joint research, contract research and consulting are 
conducive to academic output, involvement in patenting and academic entrepreneurship 
may not generate similar complementarities with research.  
One implication of our findings is that academics do not expect research-related benefits 
from patenting and spin-off activity. We can speculate on the reasons for the apparent 
lack of complementarity between commercialization and research-related objectives 
although our data do not allow us to be definitive. It could be that IP restrictions implicit 
in patenting and academic entrepreneurship may play a role. However, several studies 
confirm that the relationship between academic patenting and research productivity is 
generally positive (Baldini, 2008; Geuna and Nesta, 2006): academic researchers seem 
able to deal with confidentiality and IP protection issues and publication of their 
research (Murray, 2002). It is more likely that commercialization represents the last-
stage outcome in an ongoing process of research and therefore is not expected to 
contribute to the research. Many academics view patenting as a kind of ‘side-effect’ of 
their research (Agrawal and Henderson, 2002). As relatively few academic researchers 
patent their results, and even fewer establish spin-off companies, our main finding is 
that academics choose collaboration-intensive modes of interaction with industry in 
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order to further their research activities.  
More fundamental is that we do not find confirmation of a pervasive scenario in which 
entrepreneurial academics engage with industry to commercialize their research. Rather 
than a ‘hybrid order’ in which universities and industry converge to become common 
drivers of technological and economic development, most academic researchers appear 
keen to retain their autonomy by ensuring that collaborative work with industry is at 
least compatible with their research activity. This suggests that, at least for universities, 
the benefits of university-industry collaboration are best attained by cross-fertilization 
rather encouraging academics to become economic entrepreneurs. Collaboration is 
fruitful when it facilitates or contributes to both industry applications and academic 
research. Such collaboration retains the distinctiveness of the realms of scholarship and 
industry, but enables connection via interactive links that allow academic input to 
commercial problems and promotion of new ideas and new problems for university 
research (Rosenberg, 1982; Stokes, 1997). Announcements of the entrepreneurial 
university have often been premature and based on an overstated generalization of 
insights from the life sciences (see e.g. Owen-Smith and Powell, 2001). Our analysis of 
the physical and engineering sciences is a useful corrective in this respect.  
In terms of policy, our results suggest a cautious approach to undifferentiated attempts 
to promote the entrepreneurial university. Many policy measures emphasize 
commercialization as the central mechanism for rendering university knowledge 
relevant to economy and society. These include the Bayh-Dole Act in the US and 
similar legislative initiatives in other countries, as well as governments’ attempts to 
increase ‘third stream engagement’ in universities through subsidies for technology 
transfer offices (Czarnitzki et al., 2009; Mowery and Sampat, 2005). Data on 
disclosures, patenting, licensing and spin-offs are often used as metrics for assessing 
universities’ technology transfer efforts. These types of policy measures are based on 
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the principle that universities seek to protect their IP and exploit it in the industry 
market place. As the proceeds from the commercialization of IP are usually shared 
between the university and the individual academic inventor(s), the financial incentive 
is seen as encouraging academic involvement in technology transfer (Lach and 
Schankerman, 2008).  
If, on the other hand, academics engage with industry mainly to further their research, 
then the focus on providing monetary incentives for commercialization appears 
misplaced. This is reinforced by the fact that the intention of policy-makers is not 
necessarily to maximize universities’ incomes, but rather to make technology available 
to firms and society at large. Also, universities’ efforts to reap significant income from 
commercialization are generally unsuccessful as the proceeds from licensing are usually 
decimated by the costs of patenting and maintaining technology transfer offices 
(Thursby et al., 2001). Academics should not be offered incentives to patent or to be 
entrepreneurial per se; rather they should be encouraged to engage with industry more 
generally. As our results show, collaborative engagement with industry is often viewed 
by academics as beneficial to their research and, given that industry pays for much of 
this interaction, it could be assumed that industry partners also judge it to be useful 
(Gulbrandsen and Slipersæter, 2007). Policies privileging a narrow remit of technology 
transfer offices as champions of IP protection and incubators for spin-offs (Phan and 
Siegel, 2006) might be misaligned with most academics’ motivations for working with 
industry. 
The data for our analysis are drawn from the physical and engineering sciences only. 
The life sciences are generally characterized by a high intensity of university-industry 
relationships (Powell et al., 1996) and responses from life science researchers could 
provide a different picture of the motivations underpinning IP transfer. However, as 
already mentioned, we believe that the large body of research on the life sciences has 
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resulted in too much generalization of the results. Nevertheless, further research is 
needed to generate insights from other disciplines.  
Another avenue for further research would be to examine the implications of different 
channels of interaction for the direction and quality of research conducted by academic 
researchers. Our results suggest that instances of university-industry collaboration 
should be viewed differentially in terms of judging their impact on academic research. If 
academics work with industry primarily to further their research, negative impacts on 
the direction of their research or on their research productivity arguably will be less 
likely. This holds particularly in the case that academics are motivated by learning and 
access to resources. Our data suggest that this type of collaboration is less likely to 
result in immediately, commercially relevant outputs, such as patents and spin-offs. At 
the same time, however, in the longer term, engagement in relationship-intensive 
collaboration with companies might enhance academic research output and generate 
university benefits via better research evaluations and higher levels of funding. Future 
research should seek to provide more informed judgement on the potential benefits and 
drawbacks associated with the different channels of engagement with industry used by 
academic researchers.   
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Tables and Figures  
 
Table 1. Proportion of respondents who assessed incentive items as very or extremely 
important (4 or 5 on five-point Likert scale)  
 CHNG CHEM CIVG COMP ELEC GENG MATH MENG MANG PHYS Total 
1. Applicability of research  71.9 64.9 72.2 78.5 78.8 79.0 68.8 80.7 80.0 73.1 74.5 
2. Research Income from industry  75.9 79.3 79.5 65.1 80.6 71.4 54.8 76.5 79.0 69.9 74.4 
3. Research Income from Gov. 71.4 58.6 76.8 75.0 79.0 76.5 62.9 75.8 80.0 61.2 70.8 
4. Information on industry problem  77.2 53.7 79.5 65.7 70.3 75.3 66.2 78.9 70.5 54.8 67.8 
5. Feedback from industry  42.1 44.2 62.0 53.3 67.1 58.6 36.5 58.0 49.2 46.2 52.7 
6. Information on industry research  41.1 36.3 50.7 41.3 52.1 45.5 32.8 51.6 52.5 47.1 45.0 
7. Access to materials  43.1 30.8 50.0 41.5 48.6 43.9 20.6 45.7 47.5 43.1 41.2 
8. Becoming part of a network  42.6 29.9 45.8 24.5 33.6 38.3 27.4 41.9 38.6 32.7 34.8 
9. Access to research expertise 34.5 29.6 22.2 31.4 35.4 30.6 22.6 34.8 33.9 35.0 31.5 
10. Access to equipment  19.3 22.2 18.3 10.4 35.7 25.5 9.7 23.0 15.5 25.2 22.0 
11. Source of personal income  17.2 12.2 15.5 31.1 15.7 11.1 26.2 11.2 15.3 15.8 16.1 
12. Seeking IPR  8.8 13.3 10.0 5.8 11.3 12.4 3.2 9.9 5.2 21.6 11.0 
Number of observations* 58 209 73 107 146 100 66 163 62 104 1088 
Notes: Abbreviations: CHNG, Chemical Engineering; CHEM, Chemistry; CIVG; Civil Engineering; 
COMP, Computer Science; ELEC, Electrical and Electronic Engineering; GENG, General Engineering; 
MATH, Mathematics; MENG, Mechanical, Aeronautical and Manufacturing Engineering, MANG; 
Materials and Metallurgy; PHYS, Physics.  
* The total number of observations slightly varies across items due to missing responses. 
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Table 2: Summary of factor analysis results  
Motivational items  Motivation 
Source of personal income  
Seeking IPRs  
Commercialization 
 
Information on industry problems 
Feedback from industry 
Information on industry research 
Applicability of research 
Becoming part of a network 
 
 
Learning 
 
Access to materials  
Access to research expertise 
Access to equipment  
 
Access to in-kind resources 
 
Research income from industry  
Research income from Gov.  
Access to funding 
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Table 3.Relationship between frequency of interaction and motivations  
Ordered Logistic Regressions. Dependent variables: frequency of engagement in five channels    
 Joint 
Research 
Contract 
Research 
Consulting Spin-offs Patents 
Commercialization 0.020 0.042 0.559 *** 0.488 *** 0.758 *** 
 (0.074) (0.071) (0.077) (0.102) (0.087) 
Learning 0.265 *** 0.276 *** 0.177 * 0.197 -0.019 
 (0.088) (0.093) (0.094) (0.139) (0.109) 
Funding Resources 0.129 * 0.299 *** 0.133 * 0.039 0.037 
 (0.068) (0.076) (0.075) (0.106) (0.092) 
In-kind Resources 0.091 -0.231 *** -0.196 ** -0.349 *** -0.204 ** 
 (0.068) (0.071) (0.077) (0.108) (0.085) 
N. Joint publ. (ln) 0.102 0.178 * 0.083 0.275 ** 0.195 * 
 (0.099) (0.098) (0.098) (0.130) (0.107) 
N. Collab. Gr. (ln) 0.059 * 0.041 0.059 * 0.099 ** 0.032 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.047) (0.037) 
Age -0.021 ** -0.003 -0.018 ** 0.009 0.007 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.012) (0.010) 
Professor status 0.581 *** 0.441 ** 0.438 ** 0.407 * 0.291 
 (0.183) (0.177) (0.173) (0.243) (0.205) 
Industry inc/staff (ln) 0.164 0.305 ** -0.088 0.064 0.227 
 (0.126) (0.122) (0.134) (0.175) (0.149) 
Public inc/staff (ln) -0.234 * 0.122 -0.039 -0.097  0.299 * 
 (0.141) (0.142) (0.162) (0.216) (0.181) 
Dept. staff (ln) 0.027 0.129 0.192 0.025 0.005 
 (0.139) (0.144) (0.154) (0.187) (0.165) 
RAE 2001 Low -0.037 0.276 0.363 ** -0.077 0.149 
 (0.179) (0.183) (0.185) (0.267) (0.210) 
RAE 2001 High -0.085 -0.052 0.163 0.119 -0.119 
 (0.182) (0.191) (0.195) (0.269) (0.223) 
Chemistry --- -0.644 *** -0.681 *** --- 0.799 *** 
  (0.242) (0.251)  (0.285) 
Civil Engineering -0.717 *** --- --- --- --- 
 (0.278)     
Computer Science --- -1.223 *** -1.482 *** --- --- 
  (0.296) (0.332)   
Electric & Electronic Eng. --- --- -0.995 *** --- 0.909 *** 
   (0.255)  (0.296) 
General Engineering --- -0.641 ** --- --- 0.669 ** 
  (0.271)   (0.321) 
Mathematics -0.849 ** --- --- --- --- 
 (0.399)     
Physics --- -0.747 ** -0.976 ** --- --- 
  (0.369) (0.387)   
Prob.  0.688 0.505 1.439 ** -0.298 1.435 ** 
 (0.584) (0.573) (0.579) (0.849) (0.677) 
Threshold / Cut point 1 0.986 2.393 ** 2.745 *** 3.444 *** 5.418 *** 
Region dummies Included Included Included Included Included 
Number of observations 960 964 966 964 959 
Log Likelihood -918.2 -902.0 -870.9 -469.7 -671.6 
Restricted Log Likelihood -973.3 -991.6 -975.9 -511.4 -765.6 
Pseudo R2 Nagelkerke 0.13 0.19 0.23 0.13 0.22 
Note: Two tailed t-test: * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors between brackets. For 
discipline dummy variables, only significant coefficients are shown in the table.  
Appendix  
Table A1: Descriptive statistics for dependent variables 
Dependent Variables Average  St. 
Dev. 
Min. Max. % Observations 
Category ‘0’ 
% Obs. 
Category ‘1’ 
% Obs. 
Category ‘2’ 
Number 
valid Obs. 
1. Joint Research 0.79 0.70 0 2 37.2 47.1 15.8 1079 
2. Contract Res. 0.85 0.70 0 2 33.5 48.5 18.1 1085 
3. Consulting 0.68 0.71 0 2 46.6 38.8 14.6 1087 
4. Spin-offs 0.19 0.43 0 2 82.9 15.3 1.8 1085 
5. Patenting 0.29 0.56 0 2 68.9 23.7 7.4 1079 
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 Ave. St. Dev. Min. Max. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Commercialization 2.04 0.91 1 5             
2. Learning 3.50 0.85 1 5 0.24            
3.Funding resources 3.97 0.94 1 5 0.13 0.28           
4. In-kind resources 2.78 1.06 1 5 0.19 0.48 0.22          
5. Ln Joint Pub 0.52 0.73 0.0 3.81 0.01 0.02 0.11 0.04         
6. Ln Coll. Grant 2.86 2.47 0.0 7.60 0.02 0.06 0.15 0.09 0.07        
7. Age 45.9 9.86 27 75 -0.05 0.04 0.05 -0.01 0.16 0.27       
8. Professor 0.53 0.50 0.0 1 -0.02 -0.02 0.09 -0.03 0.22 0.26 0.59      
9. Indu. Inc./staff 1.61 0.78 0.0 3.53 -0.04 0.05 0.13 0.02 0.12 0.11 0.01 -0.01     
10. Pub. Inc./staff 2.61 0.70 0.0 4.33 -0.01 -0.08 -0.01 0.02 0.14 0.11 -0.01 0.05 0.34    
11. Ln Staff 4.22 0.68 2.07 5.53 0.01 -0.04 -0.02 0.01 0.09 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.42 0.37   
12. Low RAE 0.31 0.46 0 1 0.02 0.07 0.07 0.02 -0.04 -0.09 -0.01 -0.06 -0.12 -0.36 -0.41  
13. High RAE 0.30 0.46 0 1 -0.01 -0.05 -0.03 0.01 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.20 0.36 0.43 -0.43 
33 
Table A2: Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix for explanatory and control variables  
Correlation coefficients significant at the 0.05 level, in bold. 
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Table A3: Factor analysis results: Incentives for interacting with industry  
 Mean St. Dev. Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
Source of personal income 2.04 1.25 -0.032 -0.079 -0.001 0.896 
Seeking IPRs 2.05 1.11 0.324 0.340 0.105 0.521 
Information on industry problems 3.87 1.07 0.800 0.079 0.160 -0.033 
Feedback from industry 3.41 1.19 0.721 0.220 0.080 0.081 
Information on industry research 3.26 1.21 0.656 0.303 0.216 0.012 
Applicability of research 3.99 1.05 0.764 0.044 -0.015 0.075 
Becoming part of a network 2.94 1.21 0.625 0.288 0.016 0.064 
Research income from industry 4.01 1.12 0.064 -0.001 0.831 0.178 
Research income from government 3.93 1.16 0.159 0.172 0.772 -0.121 
Access to materials 3.03 1.35 0.193 0.735 0.047 0.020 
Access to research expertise 2.83 1.23 0.254 0.812 0.011 -0.036 
Access to equipment 2.48 1.48 0.127 0.821 0.155 0.082 
Rotation sums of squared loadings 2.82 2.26 1.40 1.15 
Proportion of variance explained (%) 23.48 18.81 11.69 9.55 
Cumulative proportion of variance explained (%) 23.48 42.29 53.98 63.53 
 
Table A4: Relationship between frequency of interaction and motivations 
Results of multivariate probit analysis. Dependent variables are dichotomous taking the 
value of 1 if the degree of engagement is above the median for a given engagement 
channel (and 0 otherwise) 
 
 Joint  
Research  
(3 times or more)  
Contract 
Research        
(3 times or more) 
Consulting   
(3 times or more) 
Spin-offs      
(at least once) 
Patents       
(at least once) 
Commercialisation -0.008 0.036 0.281 *** 0.288 *** 0.451 *** 
 (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.055) (0.054) 
Learning 0.219 *** 0.163 ** 0.152 * 0.086 -0.005 
 (0.077) (0.076) (0.080) (0.071) (0.066) 
Funding Resources 0.096 0.225 *** 0.001 0.019 0.062 
 (0.066) (0.067) (0.066) (0.059) (0.055) 
In-kind Resources 0.048 -0.137 ** -0.146 ** -0.195 *** -0.113 ** 
 (0.058) (0.058) (0.061) (0.056) (0.050) 
N. Joint publ. (ln) 0.121 0.097 0.057 0.116 0.100 
 (0.077) (0.077) (0.082) (0.075) (0.067) 
N. Collab. Gr. (ln) 0.066 ** 0.033 0.047 0.053 ** 0.009 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.030) (0.027) (0.024) 
Age -0.018 ** -0.002 -0.021 *** 0.004 0.004 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) 
Professor status 0.372 ** 0.283 * 0.322 ** 0.201 0.124 
 (0.146) (0.146) (0.155) (0.139) (0.126) 
Industry inc/staff (ln) 0.089 0.189 * -0.041 0.017 0.064 
 (0.101) (0.107) (0.109) (0.097) (0.090) 
Public inc/staff (ln) -0.119 0.114 -0.117 -0.081 0.145 
 (0.113) (0.126) (0.117) (0.106) (0.106) 
Dept. staff (ln) 0.038 0.184 -0.019 -0.032 -0.004 
 (0.109) (0.114) (0.114) (0.106) (0.097) 
RAE 2001 Low 0.049 0.205 0.241 -0.084 0.054 
 (0.147) (0.149) (0.156) (0.142) (0.128) 
RAE 2001 High 0.035 0.109 0.405 ** 0.091 -0.032 
 (0.153) (0.154) (0.164) (0.147) (0.135) 
Prob. (formal interaction) -0.001 0.336 0.906 0.039 0.869 * 
 (0.553) (0.573) (0.656) (0.488) (0.455) 
Intercept -1.753 ** -3.879 *** -1.366 -1.686 ** -3.022 *** 
Reg. & Discipline dummies Included Included Included Included Included 
      
 Rho1 Rho2 Rho3 Rho4  
Rho2 0.435 (0.064)     
Rho3 0.349 (0.072)  0.389 (0.068)    
Rho4 0.374 (0.067) 0.176 (0.075) 0.082 (0.076)   
Rho5 0.257 (0.065) 0.207 (0.066) 0.086 (0.072) 0.551 (0.052)  
Observations 945     
LL -1894.5     
LL0 -1989.8     
Wald χ2(160)  433.4     
 
Note: Two tailed t-test: * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Standard errors between brackets. All regressions 
include discipline dummies.
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